On March 20, 2009, Russia announced that it has reached an agreement to build new military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway regions that split from Georgia after a brief war last August.
According to Kremlin watchers, this move signaled that Russia’s increasingly hardnosed foreign policy is likely to continue, especially in regards to its unilateral support for separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia still claims sovereignty over both, and so far Russia and Nicaragua have been the only countries to recognize the two as autonomous regions.
“The reality is that these regions are lost to Georgia for a long time,” says Dr. Lincoln Mitchell, a professor at the School of International Affairs at Columbia University and an expert on the region. “Maybe not forever, but a long time.”
This is because Georgia cannot retake the regions militarily unless it receives help from allies, which is unlikely, analysts say. What’s more, pressure on Russia from Georgia’s allies in the west to withdraw soldiers that have remained in the breakaway regions since the August war has been largely ignored.
“What Russia is doing [by holding troops within Georgian borders] is a violation of international law,” says Stephen Pifer, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute and ambassador to the Ukraine during the Clinton administration. “Georgia’s position is supported around the world, but it’s unlikely that Russia will withdraw from these regions anytime soon.”
The war between Georgia and Russia began the evening of August 7, 2008, when Georgia responded to Russian provocations in South Ossetia by shelling the capital of the province, Tskhinvali. Russia responded by pouring troops over its southern border and into Georgia, claiming that it was acting to protect its citizens in the region. Russian troops stopped just 25 miles short of Tbilisi, the capital city, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy managed to negotiate a ceasefire on August 12.
Foreign policy experts generally agree that Russia’s goading of the weaker Georgian force was intended to send a message.
“The Russians were saying [to western powers that] if you want to play in this part of the world, you’re going to pay,” says Mr. Mitchell. This is because Georgia had recently been a darling of the west, attracting praise for the transparency of its government, and foreign investment to its liberalized economy. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili also made no secret of his hope that his country might soon be allowed to join the EU and NATO.
The idea of having a NATO member on its border never sat well with Russian president-turned-prime-minister Vladamir Putin. Putin’s rise to power is often attributed to his promise to bring Russia “up from its knees,” meaning out from under the collective thumb of the United States and the European Union. The attitude translated into a more assertive foreign policy for the country, and, excepting Russia’s windfall of oil money, has been most responsible for Putin’s consistently high poll numbers.
“There is a narrative in Russia that has become widely accepted, that the United States and the west took advantage of Russia, that we tried to keep the country weak after the collapse of the Soviet Union,” says Mr. Pifer. Lately Russia has seemed intent on reasserting itself as a world power.
As for the likelihood of future violence as a result of Russian forays beyond its own borders, it would seem that the economy, rather than diplomacy, will be the determining factor. Russian officials initially denied that the world banking crisis would have an effect on their country. Now the rouble is in freefall and it is predicted that the Russian economy will contract between 5% and 10% this year. This will especially pinch after eight solid years of growth. Russia might now become more hawkish, to convince citizens that their country continues to grow in power, or it may focus inward, attempting to repair its tattered economy. The answer is unclear.
One topic that western and Russian diplomats have been able to agree on is anti-proliferation. Earlier this month secretary of state Hillary Clinton agreed to a restoration of NATO-Russian relations (severed after the Georgian-Russian war) to discuss a replacement for the strategic arms reduction treaty set to expire in December. That treaty, called START-1, was intended to reduce nuclear stockpiles in each country to around 2,000 warheads apiece, and has been deemed a success. President Obama has set “getting to zero” as the guiding principle of his nuclear policy, and both sides now agree that they are ready for further reductions. This is a sign that Russia may be ready to again speak civilly with the west, analysts say.
“Russia does have a real interest in this issue, and it may lead to reengagement” says Mr. Pifer. “But ultimately we must find a way to return to a place where the Kremlin asks, ‘will this damage our relationship with Washington?’ before they take drastic action.”
